In multi-issue allocation situations, we have to divide a resource among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present an axiomatic characterization of the proportional rule.
Introduction
In bankruptcy situations, a resource must be divided among several claimants. The problem arises when the resource is not sufficient to cover all the claims. A typical example is when a firm goes bankrupt. The objective is to identify well-behaved rules for dividing the resource among agents. The literature devoted to the formal analysis of bankruptcy problems originates in an article by O'Neill [9] . See Thomson [10] for a survey.
In bankruptcy situations, the claim of each agent is a number. However, there are many real-world situations where the resource must be divided not on the basis of a single claim for each agent, but several claims related to different issues. These kind of problems are called multi-issue allocation (MIA) situations and were introduced in Calleja et al. [2] . Lorenzo-Freire et al. [7] , Moreno-Ternero [8] , González-Alcón et al. [4] , Lorenzo-Freire et al. [6] , Ju et al. [5] , and Bergantiños et al. [1] have also studied the MIA situations.
Here is a concrete example. In most Spanish Universities, once the total annual operating budget for the issues is decided, it is the responsibility of the senior administrators of each department to decide how much is allocated to each issue, such as research, teaching, etc., and submit a quantified request. Once the issue allocations are finalized, the university compiles the university's annual operating budget and each department is notified of the amount assigned to each issue. Other examples are: the European Community, which distributes its budget among several issues (agriculture, roads, research, etc.) and each member state (Spain, France, etc.) makes a claim for each issue. The Spanish government divides the budget among several issues (health, education, etc.) and each autonomous region (Galicia, Madrid, Catalonia, etc.) makes a claim for each issue. The government of Galicia divides its budget among several issues (roads, education, etc.) and each City Council (Vigo, Santiago de Compostela, etc.) makes a claim for each issue.
All these situations can be modeled as a 4-tuple (R, N, E, (c ki ) k∈R,i∈N ), where R is the set of issues (research, teaching, etc., in the university example), N is the set of agents (the departments), E is the resource (the amount the university has decided to assign to all the departments), and c ki is the claim of agent i on issue k.
In bankruptcy, a rule is a vector (f i ) i∈N , where f i is the amount assigned to the agent i. In MIA situations, two approaches are possible. Approach 1: as in bankruptcy, a rule is a vector (f i ) i∈N , where f i is the amount assigned to the agent i. It is followed in Calleja et al. [2] , González-Alcón et al. [4] , and Ju et al. [5] .
Approach 2: we first divide the budget among the issues. In a second step, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents. Here, a rule is a matrix (f ki ) k∈R,i∈N , where f ki denotes the amount received by the agent i on issue k. No agent can spend part of the amount he receives for an issue on another issue. This approach is more popular in many situations, for example, the ones mentioned above. It is followed in Lorenzo-Freire et al. [7] , Moreno-Ternero [8] , and Bergantiños et al. [1] .
In this article, we follow Approach 2. We focus on the proportional rule (P). Moreno-Ternero [8] is the only study that follows Approach 2 devoted to P in MIA situations, although he does not provide a characterization of P in MIA situations. Ju et al. [5] study P in MIA situations following Approach 1. They characterize P generalizing the result given by Chun [3] for P for bankruptcy. We provide the first characterization of P using properties adapted to MIA situations. Our result also generalizes the characterization of P for bankruptcy given by Chun [3] . The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce MIA situations. In Section 3, we present our results.
Multi-issue allocation situations
In this section, we introduce the model of bankruptcy and the proportional bankruptcy rule. We then introduce the MIA situations.
A bankruptcy problem, O'Neill [9] , is a triple (N, E, c). Here, N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents. The resource E ≥ 0 represents the amount to be divided among the agents, c = (c i ) i∈N ∈ R N + and for
A MIA situation, Calleja et al. [2] , is a 4-tuple (R, N, E, C ). Here, R = {1, . . . , r} is the set of issues; N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents; E ≥ 0 is the amount of resource to be divided; for each i ∈ N and k ∈ R, c ki is the amount claimed by player i ∈ N on issue k ∈ R and C = (c ki ) k∈R,i∈N ∈ R R×N + . We assume 0 ≤ E ≤ k∈R i∈N c ki .
Note that a bankruptcy situation is a MIA situation with |R| = 1.
In order to define a rule, two approaches are possible. In the first approach, a rule assigns an amount to each agent (Calleja et al. [2] , González-Alcón et al. [4] , and Ju et al. [5] ). In the second approach, a rule assigns an amount to each agent and each issue (Lorenzo-Freire et al. [7] , Moreno-Ternero [8] , and Bergantiños et al. [1] ). We follow the second approach.
A MIA rule f is a function that associates with each MIA situation
• k∈R i∈N f ki (R, N, E, C ) = E.
Proportional rule
Probably, the most important rules in bankruptcy are the proportional (P) rule, the constrained equal awards (CEA) rule, and the constrained equal losses (CEL) rule. The three rules have been extended to MIA situations. Lorenzo-Freire et al. [7] and Bergantiños et al. [1] give several characterizations of CEA and CEL using the properties adapted to MIA situations. In this section, we provide the first characterization of P using properties adapted to MIA situations. There exist two ways of extending P from bankruptcy situations to MIA situations. We can use a two-stage procedure as in Lorenzo-Freire et al. [7] . We first divide the resource among the issues, following the proportional bankruptcy rule. Second, we divide the amount assigned to each issue among the agents, following also the proportional bankruptcy rule. The second way is a one-stage procedure. We also assign to each agent in each issue, an amount proportional to the claim of the agent in the issue. Moreno-Ternero [8] proves that the proportional rule is the unique bankruptcy rule such that the one-stage extension and two-stage extension coincide. Thus, we define the proportional rule as follows. Bergantiños et al. [1] extend several properties from the bankruptcy situations to MIA situations by invoking the properties twice. The property is firstly interpreted for the set of issues and then for the agents within each issue. We apply the same idea to NAT .
Non-advantageous transfer across issues (NATA). Let (R, N, E, C ) and (R , N , E , C ) be such that (R, N, E) = (R , N , E ) and S ⊂ R such that k∈S i∈N c ki = k∈S i∈N c ki and c ki = c ki when
NATA implies that if the agents redistribute their claims among a group of issues, then the amount assigned to each other issue does not change. For instance, the level of total resources allocated to health care depends only on the total claim in health care i∈N c ki and the aggregate claim on the rest of the issues l =k i∈N c li , but it does not depend on the way in which this aggregate claim is redistributed among the rest of the issues.
Non-advantageous transfer within issues
NATI says that if a group of agents redistribute their claims within an issue, then the amount assigned to the other agents in this issue does not change. For instance, the amount received by a local government i in health care, provided that the claims of all the agents in the rest of issues are the same, depends only on the local government's claim in health care (c ki ) and the aggregate claim of the other agents in health care j =i c kj , but it does not depend in the way in which this aggregate claim in health care is redistributed among the rest of the agents.
We now give a characterization of the proportional rule with NATA and NATI. Theorem 1. Let (R, N, E, C ) be such that |N| ≥ 3 and |R| ≥ 3. Then, P is the unique rule satisfying NATA and NATI.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is obvious that P satisfies NATA and NATI.
The uniqueness is a consequence of the following claims. We give a sketch of the proof. Let f be a rule satisfying NATI and NATA. Claim 1. Let q = (q li ) l∈R,i∈N be such that for each l ∈ R, (q li ) i∈N belongs to the simplex in R N . For each R, E, (x l ) l∈R we define f q in such a way that for each k ∈ R, Lorenzo-Freire et al. [7] define a two-stage procedure to define the MIA rules from bankruptcy rules. They first apply a rule for dividing the resource among the issues. Later, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents by applying another rule. Note that this bankruptcy rule can be different from the first one.
• The MIA rule obtained by dividing among the issues with CEA and within each issue with P satisfies NATI but fails NATA.
• The MIA rule obtained by dividing among the issues with P and within each issue with CEA satisfies NATA but fails NATI.
